Analysis: Turkey re-enters orbit of the West

January 8, 2013 | Filed under: Geopolitics

Ankara takes small step toward Jerusalem, but no giant leap.

WASHINGTON – Turkey took a small step toward Israel in December when it dropped its opposition to Israeli participation as a partner nation in certain NATO activities planned for 2013.

Israel interpreted the move as an unspoken quid pro quo, coming as it did at the same time Turkey, a NATO member state, was asking the military alliance to station Patriot missile batteries along its border to defend it against Syrian violence.

NATO, a consensus-based organization, has been frustrated with Turkish obstruction of Israeli participation since relations between the two Mediterranean countries broke down in 2010 and has long been urging them to reconcile.

Neither Turkey nor NATO has confirmed that Ankara’s easing of its objection to Israel’s inclusion in 2013 NATO activities – which consist of conferences, courses and seminars – was a condition for approval of the Patriot missile deployment.

But whether that easing was part of a quid pro quo or not, it is consistent with other recent overtures toward Israel. These overtures, coupled with Turkey’s request for NATO military assistance – complete with the stationing of Western forces on Turkish soil to operate the Patriot batteries – indicate Ankara is moving back toward the Western orbit after years of distancing itself.

Since the Islamist AKP came to power a decade ago, Turkey has pursued a policy of “zero problems with neighbors” that precipitated a Turkish reorientation toward the East, where it improved its relationships with Syria, Kurdistan and other former adversaries as part of a bid to become a regional powerbroker and even a hegemon. It was under this banner that the country facilitated indirect negotiations between Syria and Israel in 2008.

But as Turkey nurtured ties with other Islamist parties such as Hamas in Gaza, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and even the Iranian leadership, it began to disassociate itself from Israel.

Israeli-Turkish ties seriously deteriorated when an Israeli strike on Gaza to eliminate rocket fire on the South ended the negotiations with Syria, provoking Turkish ire, and then ruptured in 2010 when a Turkish-flagged ship tried to break the Gaza blockade and Israeli commandoes used force to stop it, resulting in the death of nine Turkish citizens.

“If you want to be the leader of the Arab and Muslim world, good relations with Israel is not necessarily the ticket you want to run on,” points out Dan Arbell, who served on Israel’s team during negotiations with Syria and is now a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution in Washington.

Turkey’s strategic approach to the region, however, suffered a major blow amidst the upheaval of the Arab Spring.

Syria returned to its historic antagonism, even letting a few stray shells ostensibly aimed at opposition fighters land in Turkish territory this fall, and Egypt’s emboldened Muslim Brotherhood, rather than the AKP, was the party to lead November’s cease-fire talks between Israel and Hamas.

Around that time, reports emerged of two rare rounds of conversations between Israeli and Turkish officials, which dealt with Gaza but also touched on the relationship between the two nations.

Arbell says the conversations stemmed from an emerging understanding on the part of Turkey that shutting out Israel was damaging its regional role.

“There are many similar interests and a similar view about what should be done in Syria,” he says, mentioning a shared aversion to regional instability and massive numbers of refugees flowing over the Syrian border. “A lack of dialogue between Turkey and Israel was seen as hurting those interests.”

When Syrian mortars started landing in Turkey, the government saw that its own security in the region could be at stake.

Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, says Turkey realized “it cannot be alone in this neighborhood and needs friends and allies.”

And so, he says, “NATO has come forth to the rescue as Turkey’s indispensable ally.”

The Turkish embrace of NATO, which Cagaptay described as stronger than at any point in the last 10 years, has been at the popular as well as governmental level.

Despite the presence of American and European troops, Cagaptay notes, “Not a person has made an objection.”

Still, these changes don’t mean that Turkey has reverted to its pre-AKP posture; ties with Israel remain deeply strained and the move toward the West hasn’t been accompanied by a rejection of the East.

Israeli officials say even at NATO the new Turkish stance “is not a total solution,” as Ankara continues to oppose upgrades in Israel’s status and other more substantial actions within the alliance.

Turkish diplomatic sources, meanwhile, say that, “Turkey’s position did not change on this matter.”

Arbell characterizes the shift as a “refocus or a calibration,” since Turkey feels it has rotated its orientation too much and wants to put itself firmly in the camps of both the East and the West, but not sacrifice the former for the latter.

“It puts Turkey more in the framework of a Western democratic context, rather than that of leaders such as [Syrian President Bashar] Assad or [Iranian President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad or others, so perhaps it makes it easier to deal with Turkey,” Arbell says. “The dialogue has broadened and deepened, but we’re not there yet.”

Source: jpost.com

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  • makos

    This is why I urge Greece and especially Cyprus to be cautious with Israel. You cannot rely your security on a single partner. The international arena in this area is currently highly volatile and more troubles should be expected in the future. Hopefully both Greek states have understand and try to rationalize the friendship ‘attack’ from Israel.

    • Phoevos

      But what is there to be cautious about? In the event Israel can warm up with Turkey again, Israel would be very valuable as an intermediary.

      I can’t see how Greece could lose with Israel, even if Israel becomes a friend of Turkey.

      Isn’t this the whole idea? To de-escalate rather than escalate?

      • makos

        Turkey is currently on the verge of developing into a regional power. Probably It will eventually succeed in that, having the support of the US that needs Turkey to fill the power vacuum in the region. Greece and of course Cyprus will face the danger of becoming more and more subjected to Turkey in the long run. As long as the EU does not transform into a united political entity this will be inevitable, since both our Greek states will not have the resources to confront the emerging Turkey. So far Greece acknowledging the fact that it does not have strategic importance for the US tried to build a strong military deterrent in order to be able to negate the strategic importance of Turkey for the US. In a few years this will be over as Turkey will become relatively much stronger than Greece. So the Greeks will have to depend on foreign patrons to defend themselves. The EU could be an option, Russia another,maybe China in the future, but certainly Israel cannot play that role alone since it has a similar environment to deal with, I mean that Israel faces an existential threat and does not have the resources to deal with the Arabs surrounding its borders. It has to depend on a foreign patron ie the US to do that. So it becomes evident that Israel cannot safeguard its own very existence and at the same time balance the power of Turkey against Greece. This is why I suggest that Greece cannot play all of its cards with Israel and consider other options too. It will take much more than Israel to defend ourselves. Cyprus knows that and attracts Russia, France and Italy into the game of sharing its hydrocarbon exploration licenses. Greece should also follow that path.

        • Phoevos

          Mako:

          Only in the context of the Middle East Turkey is a regional power. The same classification is given to Iran, Iraq, Syria, Israel and Egypt. In fact of these regional Middle East powers, Israel happens to be a superpower (due to its nuclear weaponry and top notch armed forces).

          In terms of Europe, Turkey is not a regional power. The regional powers of Europe are UK, France, Italy, Germany and Russia (and maybe Spain). But that’s it. Even if Turkey enters the EU, it will not be considered a regional power.

          Therefore the Turkish regional power status is only relevant in the middle East where evey other country has the same status (i.e. a regional power).

          • makos

            Yes meaning regional I was refereeing mainly to the Middle East but also in Caucasus and maybe the Balkans at least the part of it that remains outside the EU (e.g. Albania, FYROM, Kosovo, Bosnia). The GDP of Turkey as of 2011 is at 774 million dollars with a rate of development of 8% percent at least. Turkey is still underdeveloped and with a population of 75 millions and a high birth rate still has a lot of room to develop. Much like China but in a smaller scale of course. On the other side Greece has a rather declining population of 10 millions a shrinking economy of less than 300 million dollars and a very bad outlook in general. I think there is a general consensus that Turkey will become a regional power in the future, having also in mind that Turkey will enjoy the support of the US because of the rise of Iran and Russia and because there is a power vacuum in the region with the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. Israel cannot be considered a regional power since it resides so much on an external patron, the US. In a couple of decades Turkey will be able to stand on its own feet even at the defense industry sector. Nuclear weapons are certainly a deterrent for Israel, but are we sure that Turkey will not get some too? If the west fails in stopping Iran to develop the bomb, Turkey has already expressed the necessity, an excuse actually, to develop its own nuclear arsenal to defend itself. Besides, Turkey already possess chemical weapons used in secrecy against the Kurds. Using these weapons en mass with capable delivery platforms (Turkey also develops long rage ballistic missiles) can be as destructive in terms of casualties as the use of a nuclear head.

            Actually the case of Israel and its nuclear weapons arsenal should give us a clue where we should head to. I mean that I agree with you that Israel is far less prone to being subjected to Turkey in the future because it cannot be pressured militarily (although it will certainly be open to other kinds of pressure). Greece maybe should follow the same path, especially since it does not enjoy the generous help of the US in terms of billions of dollars of free conventional armaments each year as Israel does and it will have to downgrade its military force in the near future. Greece developing a nuclear arsenal though would be extremely difficult to support it diplomatically. Maybe the political integration of the EU could be the best scenario for our future. But that’s a whole different discussion…

          • Phoevos

            Well, I thought that was the whole idea of the already existing and in force military alliance among Israel, Cyprus and Greece. It was activated about 1.5 years ago.

            The Israeli and Greek navies together have great synergies. So do the IAF and HAF; good pair in the sky. The armies of Greece and Israel are another story. I think the Israeli army is much more advanced and the Greek command has a lot to learn how to maximize its strength from Israeli tactics and training.

            Regarding the population part of Turkey growing to 85 or 100 Million people; I don’t think it’s a factor in modern war. Long gone are the days when the army size had any particular advantage. These are no longer Middle Ages. In modern war if the conflict lasts more than a month I would be surprised. There will be some intense fighting in the air and at sea (see all Israel’s modern conflicts) and I much doubt that the Turkish and Greek armies would ever have to face each other on the ground.

            You need to stop thinking of Greece as a country of 10 Million. Greece is part of Europe and its combined population is 650 Million and if you include Russia even more. Even if Greece had no army at all, I wouldn’t worry about Turkey at all as a military threat. Turkey will be defeated from the east and Greece will never be in armed conflict with her. There is more chance that Greece will be in armed conflict with the country (Iran?) that will overrun Turkey. That’s why the Israeli friendship and alliance is key. Not as a deterrent to Turkey but as a defense mechanism against a united Middle East lead by the theocracy of Iran. That’s were the danger is.

    • Eric R.

      There will be no mending fences between Israel and Turkey so long as the Islamists run Turkey, and I do not see Erdogan and his Islamists losing power for a long time, if ever, given that the Islamists are outbreeding the Secularists and will become an absolute majority soon.

      • makos

        As far as I know Secularists, although not in power, remain a strong force inside Turkey as they control and represent the most dynamic part of Turkey, that is the middle and upper class and the main economic activities. AKP, Erdogan’s party, will not easily get rid of them. AKP’s islamism is also much different that Salafist’s radical and stupid Islamism encountered in Saudi Arabia and Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood. AKP is in favor of a more pragmatic Islam that follows the Ottoman tradition that in the past allowed an alliance with Venice and France in order to fulfill strategic targets. I understand that the US are perfectly comfortable with such a version of Islam. Israel also had a good cooperation with them at the beginning. It is Turkey that broke the relations, not Israel.

        In my opinion Turkey has another problem, more important that the rise of Islamism. The problem resides into the fact that Turkey tries to transform itself from a minor country into a true regional power. Its demographics, economics and geopolitics in the region allows it to do so. It has no more to react to events. It tries to control and shape the regional balance. And this is much harder to do. Turkey does not yet have the institutions to understand and create ideas and policies. For instance the current FM of Turkey, although he has an academic background he is certainly not a serious man. I read one of his books and I understood from the first chapter that he is as much dogmatic as Hitler was. He is not realistic in the very base of his theories. So Turkey is at the beginning of a transition, but is not yet capable of defining the direction it should move to. In the long run I believe that it will be able to rationalize its policies.

        As long as Turkey refrains itself from dreaming about the creation of an empire Israel will not really feel a threat from Turkey. So in the future there might be a room from cooperation between these two countries. The rise of another region power, Iran, could be a common ground to start from.